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In 1642, the governor-general of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost- 
Indische Compagnie, VOC), Anthony van Diemen, promulgated a new legal code for 
the city of Batavia. At that time, Batavia had existed for little more than three decades, 
having been founded as a merchant fortress on the ruins of a minor Indonesian trading 
city by the formidable governor-general, J. P. Coen. By 1642, however, the population 
of the settlement had been swelled by migrants and slaves. The city needed workers— 
all the more because of high mortality rates—and it offered growing opportunities for 
commerce and service industries. The countryside around the city quickly lost its 
function as a buffer against military attack, and the thick forest gave way to farms and 
plantations supplying both the growing urban population and a healthy export trade.2
The new legal code of 1642, commonly known as the Bataviasche Statuten, had two 
purposes. First, it provided a set of rules governing the conduct of VOC employees in 
the settlement; it thus offered a detailed set of rules on proper bureaucratic conduct. 
Second, it was an attempt to provide a basis for some kind of social order in a rowdy 
port city and its immediate hinterland, far from metropolitan authorities and with a 
diverse and constantly changing population. The provisions of the code convey a 
picture of the kind of acts that vexed the Company authorities: violence between
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masters and servants or slaves, smuggling, piracy, drunkenness, murder and assault, 
promiscuity and adultery, libel, theft of wood, and escapes by slaves. Other criminal 
activities not covered in the code were simply made subject to the "statutes and 
customs of the United Netherlands."3 In the history of colonial law, however, the 
Bataviasche Statuten are notable less for their content than for the fact that they were 
designated as applying to all inhabitants of the city of Batavia and of the swathe of 
surrounding countryside under Company rule. They applied to the Europeans who 
worked for the Company, as well as to the diverse Asian population: to the Chinese, 
the Siamese, and the Indians, to the Javanese, the Balinese, and the Sundanese, to the 
Arabs, the Pampangans and the Vietnamese, and to the dozens of other ethnic groups 
drawn from the Indonesian archipelago whose members had come to the crowded city 
as traders and laborers.4
The Bataviasche Statuten were promulgated just a few years before the 1648 Treaty 
of Westphalia, the agreement between European states that sealed the end of the 
Eighty Years War between the Netherlands and Spain, as well as the German part of 
the Thirty Years War. That treaty is commonly taken to mark the start of the modern 
system of international politics because it recognized the sovereignty of the German 
princes, displacing the Holy Roman Empire—and, by implication, God—as the formal 
head of the northwest European state order. It meant that, within their own domains, 
rulers could expect to wield unfettered authority over their people: neither in matters 
of religion nor in any other matter was another ruler authorized to take a hand in what 
were now to be regarded as the internal affairs of sovereign states. In turn, 
international politics ceased to be formally hierarchical and became instead a 
specialized society of sovereign actors, who engaged with one another on the basis of 
mutual recognition, limited only by their willingness to subject themselves, voluntarily 
and revocably, to international agreements and international law.5
The Westphalia Treaty, by crystallizing the authority of states at an international 
level, also contributed to the process of consolidation and homogenization within 
states. The Treaty highlighted, though of course it did not cause, the process by which 
European polities such as France and England, Sweden and Spain, turned that general 
claim to sovereignty over their peoples into real control. In this universalizing process, 
political, cultural, and social heterogeneity was erased, both incrementally and in 
sudden leaps, so that an increasing proportion of the experiences of the peoples of 
Europe was determined in one way or another by the authorities of the central state. 
All across the continent, though to very different degrees and in different ways, local
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elites and local traditions and institutions gave way to a growing, though still 
incomplete, dependence on central polities.6
Unsurprisingly, this process was evident also in the administration of law. In any 
time of accelerating economic, social, and cultural integration between regions, the 
existence of different legal regimes becomes a matter of inconvenience or worse, 
leading to powerful practical pressures for uniformity. The elimination of local legal 
regimes was everywhere linked to the rise of central authorities and the repudiation of 
local elites and local diversity. This practice of legal universalism also came to have an 
ideological dimension: it stood for the slowly emerging doctrine of human equality, 
even though the law was able to accommodate as many exceptions in practice as the 
doctrine could. The application of the Bataviasche Statuten to all inhabitants of Batavia 
irrespective of ethnicity, therefore, was very much in the spirit of the age. As it turned 
out, however, the code of 1642 was the high-water mark of legal universalism in the 
Dutch colonial order in the Indies. During the three centuries that followed, Dutch 
authority expanded from a few coastal enclaves to encompass thousands of islands 
and millions of people, from Sumatra to New Guinea. Rather than applying a single 
law to this archipelagic empire, however, the Company, and later the Dutch 
metropolitan government, presided over what can best be called a hybrid pluralist 
legal system. Although there were important universalist elements in the colonial 
order, the Netherlands Indies comprised a multitude of separate legal jurisdictions, 
partly territorial, partly based on race or nationality. When the colonial authorities 
surrendered to the invading Japanese in 1942, exactly three centuries after the 
Bataviasche Statuten had been issued, the Netherlands Indies presented a baroque 
tangle of legal systems and jurisdictions that profoundly affected the attitude of its 
people to issues of law and order.7
Benedict Anderson has argued a strong case for the decisive role of the 
Netherlands Indies state in creating a framework within which Indonesian nationalism 
could develop. The colony was a bounded domain, its borders increasingly 
demarcated and patrolled,8 a structure that defined the limits of elite careers and 
intruded into the lives of its subjects to such an extent that politics in relation to the 
state became bound up with an emerging national identity. The colonial system of 
ethnic classification, crudely dividing the population into Europeans, Inlanders 
(Natives), and Vreemde Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals) created the basis for an 
Indonesian identity arising out of the Inlander category and thus preventing the 
important Eurasian and Chinese minorities from fully belonging to the nation.9 
Anderson's insight, however, tells only part of the story. A bitter and enduring 
complaint of Indonesian nationalists was that the colonial order employed a strategy of
6Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1976).
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divide and rule. This complaint was not just a response to the last-gasp post-war Dutch 
attempt at constructing a federal Indonesia, nor to earlier Dutch attempts to stir up 
discord and distrust within the nationalist movement, but also to the structural 
fragmentation of colonial society, which was reflected in the institutions of legal 
pluralism. Colonial Indonesia was an increasingly modern state, which could not help 
but have some of the integrating effects the sovereign states in Europe had on their 
subjects, but it was not deliberatively integrating. Rather, both in its internal political 
structure and its legal system, it devoted considerable effort to keeping its subjects 
apart from each other. Predominantly Christian ethnic groups, such as Manadonese 
and Ambonese, which also had relatively high levels of literacy in Dutch, were widely 
perceived as favored within the colonial order. The colonial state did not just separate 
Europeans and Foreign Orientals from Natives, but rather kept the Natives, too, under 
multiple jurisdictions. Around half the archipelago by area (though much less by 
population) was formally under indirect rule, in which the heirs of precolonial rajas, 
sultans, and other monarchs governed in their own right, albeit under close 
supervision from Dutch officials. The colonial authorities even increased the autonomy 
of these rulers in the late colonial period under the so-called ontvoogding 
(detutelization) program.10 In other cases, individuals carried with them the privileges 
and restrictions of a legal regime attached to their ethnicity and governing parts of 
their lives, wherever they went in the archipelago.
In Europe, the slow shift towards legal universalism was marked by growing 
support for the idea of a legal code in which all the laws governing society were to be 
set out clearly for everyone to read. The shift was slow, because legal systems tend to 
be conservative, but it reached a major landmark in the promulgation of the 
Napoleonic Code in 1804, which swept away the multitude of local laws and local 
jurisdictions in France that had survived from before the Revolution. The shift was also 
marked, however, by changes in the understanding of the purpose of the justice 
system. Paradoxically, the apotheosis of state sovereignty embodied in the Treaty of 
Westphalia had given strength to moral and intellectual arguments that the state held a 
fundamental responsibility to its people, and, indeed, that the sovereignty of the state 
might be derived from the consent of its people. Part of this intellectual movement was 
reflected in new thinking about the administration of justice.
This new thinking was based especially on the foundational work of the eighteenth 
century Italian criminologist Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764), which 
argued for a utilitarian approach to the administration of justice.11 For Beccaria, reliable 
detection and conviction of illegal acts were essential to deterring potential criminals, 
and punishment had to be neatly calibrated so that it deterred crime without straying 
into barbarism. Published only two years after Rousseau's Social Contract (1762), On 
Crimes and Punishments reflected both the growing sense in Europe that the legitimacy 
of the state was, or ought to be, justified or legitimatized by the services it provided to 
its people and the growing sense that it was possible and desirable to create rules of 
procedure by government in the interests of justice and efficiency. Beccaria's work 
underpins the view of contemporary mainstream criminology, which regards crime in
10 Harry J. Benda, "The Pattern of Administrative Reform in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in 
Indonesia," Journal o f Asian Studies 25 (1966): 589-605.
11 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1886).
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a relatively straightforward way as social pathology demanding carefully devised 
strategies for prevention. This view understands the politics of crime basically in terms 
of legitimacy: the protection of life, along with property, is one of the most important 
services that a state can provide to its people, and the legitimacy of the state, as well as 
the welfare of society, will depend to a significant extent on the capacity of the state to 
keep crime within acceptable limits. The work of the police, the courts, and other 
instruments of the legal system is to protect society against internal enemies who are 
just as real and threatening as external ones. For criminologists, the term "war on 
crime" is thus an accurate description of, rather than a loose metaphor for, the 
campaign of the state against criminal activity.
Beccaria's central argument was that certainty of punishment was a much more 
powerful deterrent than severity of punishment, and that the efforts of the state ought 
to be directed at a more comprehensive system for apprehending criminals, rather than 
at wreaking terrible punishment on an unfortunate few who fell into its hands. 
Excessive punishment, in this utilitarian view, was also likely to be a waste of social 
resources. On these grounds, among other things, Beccaria advocated doing away 
altogether with the death penalty. In his view, punishment should be scaled according 
to the severity of the crime and ought to be severe enough only to deter criminality; the 
cruelty that had been commonplace in legal systems throughout Europe in the past 
was, in his view, nothing other than tyranny.
Some forty years before Beccaria wrote, the Netherlands Indies had witnessed a 
case of the kind Beccaria would have had no difficulty in recognizing as tyranny. In 
1721, the governor-general of the Netherlands Indies, Hendrick Zwaardecroon, 
uncovered what was reported as a plot to overthrow the VOC government in Batavia 
and to establish a new regime drawn from the local elite in the Company capital, 
Batavia. There is now some doubt whether such a plot really existed, or existed in the 
well-developed form that was later reported, but the governor-general's response is 
well recorded. The alleged ringleader, Pieter Elberveld, was executed horribly. He was 
lashed to a cross, his right hand was chopped off, the flesh was pulled from his arms, 
legs, and chest with red-hot tongs, his body was slit open, and his heart was ripped out 
and presented to him before, finally, what was left of his body was cut into quarters.12 
The punishment inflicted on Elberveld has been remembered because it was harsh by 
the standards of the day, but brutality, occasionally mediated by clemency, was the 
dominant characteristic of punishment in all European societies of the time, whether 
metropolitan or colonial.13 Punishment represented, in part, a foretaste of the 
punishment to which God would condemn sinners in the life hereafter, but it was, 
above all, based on a simple notion of deterrence: brutal punishment of the guilty 
provided a horrible warning to those who might otherwise be tempted from the way of
12 L. W. G. de Roo, "De Conspiratie van 1721," Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 15 (1866): 
378; W i 11 iam Bradley Horton, "Pieter Elberveld: The Modern Adventure of an Eighteenth-Century 
Indonesian Hero," Indonesia 76 (October 2003): 147-98.
13 For more stories of punishments meted out by the VOC, see Donald Maclaine Campbell, Java Past and 
Present: A Description of the Most Beautiful Country in the World, Its Ancient History, People, Antiquities, and 
Products, vol. 2 (London: Heinemann, 1915), pp. 1074-78. British observers of the Netherlands Indies, of 
course, took some pleasure in commenting on the presumed greater cruelty of the Dutch in colonial 
administration, so these cases should be taken as extremes, rather than norms.
52 Robert Cribb
righteousness.14 Beccaria directed his arguments against brutality precisely because it 
was the standard mode of punishment.
In Europe, Beccaria's writings were widely read, and his ideas profoundly 
influenced the administration of justice. On the one hand, they contributed to a 
softening of the punishment regime and eventually to the emergence of rehabilitation 
as a major aim of the penal system. On the other hand, by emphasizing the need for 
certainty of punishment, they laid a basis for modern comprehensive policing, 
particularly the general understanding that the key to prevention was surveillance: 
that ubiquitous police intelligence would prevent crime by guaranteeing the 
perpetrators of any criminal act would be identified. This presumption remained 
strong in the twentieth century and was expressed perhaps most graphically in 
Orwell's novel 1984, in which all citizens were under constant surveillance by "Big 
Brother."
Beccaria's ideas were much slower, however, to reach the Netherlands Indies. As a 
chartered company—a commercial firm granted quasi-sovereign administrative rights 
by a metropolitan power—the VOC as an institution sat uncomfortably in relation to 
the constellation of sovereign states sanctioned by the Treaty of Westphalia, and, as a 
commercial operation, the Company identified its primary responsibility as being to its 
shareholders (and, in practice, also to its senior employees), rather than to the peoples 
who came under its rule in Asia. The implication, which came to be seen as a natural 
consequence of Beccari's insights, that the state had a natural duty to provide law and 
order to its subjects was not likely to be welcome to the Company. Like the British East 
India Company in the Indian subcontinent, therefore, the VOC preferred to preside 
over a pluralist legal system, in which the administration of justice was left as 
extensively as possible in the hands of local communities, rather than being gathered 
into the hands of the colonial state. Law was, above all, a codification of the interests of 
the Company and its employees. In 1667, for instance, notwithstanding the Bataviasche 
Statuten, the Company issued a decree authorizing Europeans
... to drive off with violence, and even to kill without any adverse consequences, 
all unknown natives found outside their fences and their houses between half 
past six in the evening and half past five in the morning, provided that they 
inform the Landdrost [sheriff] the next morning.15
The VOC attitude to the administration of law was thus governed partly by 
parsimony—there was no profit to the Company in maintaining a comprehensive 
system of courts to look after the civil interests of its subjects—and partly by a slowly 
forming sense of the political consequences of taking upon itself the task of making 
and keeping laws. Tasks that were not related to the commercial mission of the VOC 
would only draw the institution into potentially conflicting responsibilities.
The VOC's decision to choose pluralism as the underlying principle for legal 
administration became clear in 1747, when the Company, in response to the expansion 
of VOC territory in Java, formally decided to retain native law for its indigenous
14 Pieter Spierenburg, The Spectacle o f Suffering: Executions and the Evolution of Repression: From a Preindustrial 
Metropolis to the European Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
15 N. I. Plakatboek deel I, p. 95, and deel IV, p. 35, in I let Recht in N IXIX p. 355, cited in "Politie," 
Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 3 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1918), p. 441.
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subjects outside the cities and established inlandsche rechtsbanken (native courts) or 
landraden (district councils) to apply native law on the northern coast of Java. Chinese 
and other non-indigenous minorities were subject to the same courts, though legal 
issues within each community were often left to Dutch-appointed community chiefs. 
With landraden sitting only in Cirebon, Semarang, and Surabaya until the end of the 
eighteenth century, the courts were clearly not expected to become closely engaged in 
providing justice to the indigenous population of the island. Even in Batavia itself, the 
universalist claims of the Bataviasche Statuten quickly gave way in practice to a system 
of legal devolution based on ethnic groups. The different ethnic groups were obliged, 
or at least encouraged, to live in distinct quarters (wijken),16 and within each quarter the 
administration of justice was left largely in the hands of an officer appointed from the 
community to be responsible to the Company authorities. Thus, the kapitan Cina 
(captain of the Chinese) became a key figure in determining justice among Chinese; 
similar officers controlled the communities of Arabs, Indians, and Natives from other 
parts of the archipelago. Dutch law served the interests of Europeans. A British visitor 
to Batavia in the eighteenth century complained:
Any instances of the law inflicting death is [sic] generally upon Malays or 
Chinese; for there are few Dutchmen that suffer, being brought off some way or 
other. When I was there, a Dutch soldier having some words with a Chinese 
merchant, the latter was instantly stabbed. The Chinese chief indeed demanded 
justice, but I have never heard of this soldier having been tried or punished.17
Outside the towns, the VOC depended largely on indigenous rulers. Although here 
and there the VOC had extended its rule in the archipelago by means of armed 
conquest, much of its hegemony was based, at least formally, on treaties and 
agreements with indigenous rulers, who made concessions to the commercial interests 
of the Company while remaining formally in control of their domains. This process 
seldom gave rise to any need to replace the legal systems of those indigenous rulers 
with a colonial system. The Company's most pressing interests were served by what 
amounted to a practice of extra-territoriality for Europeans—that is, wherever they 
went in the archipelago, Europeans were considered to be under the authority of VOC 
courts rather than indigenous ones. The state of law and order amongst the indigenous 
population was of little or no interest to Company officials.
The attitude of the VOC contrasted with that of its counterpart in India, the East 
India Company. Although the East India Company toyed with pluralism in the 
decades immediately after its first major territorial acquisition—Bengal, in 1765—the 
forces pressing for legal universalism (that is to say, a single law for everyone within 
the Company's jurisdiction) were increasingly powerful. On the surface, the dominant 
spirit from early in the nineteenth century was what Mark Brown has called "an 
invasive Anglicanism whose spirit is perhaps best evinced in Bentinck's abolition of 
Sati [widow burning] in 1829 on the grounds of its fundamental immorality."18 
Alongside this moral concern, however, was the same practical one that drove
16 Wouter Brokx, Het Recht tot Wonen en tot Reizen in Nederlandsch-Indie ('s-Hertogenbosch: C. N. Teulings, 
1925).
17 [C. F. Noble], A Voyage to the East Indies in 1747 and 1748 (London: Becket and Dehondt, 1762), p. 89.
18 Mark Brown, "Crime, Governance, and the Company Raj: The Discovery of Thuggee," British Journal of 
Criminology 42 (2002): 79.
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European metropolitan governments to standardize and universalize their laws. It was 
seriously inconvenient in many contexts for different people to function under 
different laws within the same jurisdiction. Legal pluralism inevitably created legal 
complexity that made the administration of laws difficult. Complexity and difficulty, in 
turn, created legal uncertainty, which was undesirable in a modernizing society. This 
complexity was especially acute in commercial law, and the need to eliminate 
complexity and uncertainty was the driving force behind the steady assimilation of 
Chinese residents of the Indies to European law during the first half of the twentieth 
century.19 Just as important, legal universalism did not in any way imply the need for 
legal equality. As Anatole France memorably put it at the end of the nineteenth 
century, "The poor must work ..., in presence of the majestic quality of the law which 
prohibits the wealthy as well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from 
begging in the streets, and from stealing bread."20It was a standard feature of universal 
legal systems that the weight of specific laws would fall unevenly on different social 
groups. Nothing in a universalist system, moreover, stood in the way of legal 
discretion, the right of state authorities to decide that some people, and not others, 
would be prosecuted for criminal acts.
The legal pluralism of the VOC colony had been grounded in practicality. The 
Company, like other European chartered companies, had a sharp eye on the 
profitability of its colonial ventures and was wary of the distraction and expense 
involved in establishing a legal system for all its subjects. More generally, the VOC had 
come to the practical conclusion that the most straightforward way to rule the Indies 
was to devolve to other authorities all matters of justice that did not directly impinge 
on Company interests. As long as the Company existed, the arrangement was a simple 
one, and courts needed to meet only sporadically. What is remarkable is that the 
practice of far-reaching legal pluralism remained a major element in Dutch colonial 
thinking about law until the very end of the colonial period.
The imposition of metropolitan rule on the Indies in the early nineteenth century 
came about because of the financial collapse of the VOC at the end of the eighteenth 
century and because of the disruption caused by the Napoleonic Wars, rather than 
because of any serious metropolitan impulse to take charge of the colony and rule it 
better. In the early nineteenth century, moreover, the Netherlands was poor and 
looked forward to the potential for significant income from the colony. At the 
handover of power, therefore, there was generated little pressure to change the 
colonial legal system so that it would operate on a more universalist basis. In fact, in 
1819, indigenous laws and customs (inlandse wetten en gewoonten) were declared 
applicable to all indigenes (including those in the cities).21 Although the new colonial 
authorities were not motivated by purely commercial motives in the way the 
Company's directors had been, the need to turn a profit from the colony had 
overriding priority and led to the imposition of the Cultivation System in 1830, in
19 Patricia Tjiook-Liem, De Rechtspositie van de Chinezen in Nederltmds-Indie 1848-1942: Wetgevingsbeleid 
tussen Beginsel en Belting (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2009); Fasseur, "Cornerstone and Stumbling 
Block."
20 Anatole France, The Red Lily [Le lys rouge](Paris: Mazarin, 1905 [orig. ed. 1894]), p. 87.
21 Art 121, Reglement op de administratie der politie enz., Indisch Stnntsblnd 1819 nr. 20, quoted in C. 
Fasseur, "Een Vergeten Strafwetboek," in Handhaving van de Reehtsorde: Btmdel aangeboden atm Albert 
Mulder (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1988), p. 38.
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which the main aim was the delivery of profitable tropical produce to Dutch business.22 
The Cultivation System, moreover, depended on binding Javanese peasants to the land 
and restricting their freedom to change residence or even to travel. Legal 
differentiation according to ethnicity thus coincided directly with colonial economic 
interests. Political reform for the sake of abstract principles of legal universalism was 
not on the agenda.
As communications with Europe improved, and as progressive ideas grew stronger 
in the Netherlands and even among European settlers in the colony, the Netherlands 
Indies could not escape pressure to move towards legal universalism and towards the 
modern doctrine of the state's responsibility to its subjects. Nonetheless, as we shall 
see, this pressure was not sufficient to erase the dominant pattern of legal pluralism in 
the colony.
In the 1840s, the colony began to experience an informal campaign for legal 
universalism, that is, for the application of European law to all sections of colonial 
society. The most important element in the discourse attacking legal pluralism lay in 
telling stories of the abuse of power by indigenous rulers, with the implication that 
closer supervision by the European colonial authorities would improve standards.23 
Thus, for instance, Baron W. R. van Hoevell told of a rocky cleft in the uplands 
between Tegal and Banyumas in central Java where, in former times, the indigenous 
authorities would sometimes dump suspected criminals, their hands bound to their 
sides so that they could not escape, and leave them there to die slowly of thirst and 
exposure. The motive for this cruelty, according to Van Hoevell, was simply to avoid 
the costs and inconvenience associated with keeping the prisoners in detention.24 25
Another colonial official reported how village authorities in West Sumatra had sliced a 
murderer to death and distributed his body parts to be eaten by the other villagers.2" 
Such stories may well have been exaggerated, or even completely untrue, but they 
contributed to a shift in public opinion among the Dutch in both colony and metropole 
in favor of legal reform.
The power of these stories arose partly from the absolute sense of injustice and 
abuse of power that they conjured up, partly from the growing sense that the Dutch
22 C. Fasseur, The Politics of Colonial Exploitation: Java, the Dutch, and the Cultivation System (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1992).
23 In fact, this kind of reflection of the alleged cruelty or inadequacy of native justice was an older 
phenomenon. During the short British interregnum, the authorities issued a "Regulation for the more 
effectual administration of justice in the provincial courts of Java," which provided that native criminal 
law should not be applied when to do so would be in conflict with principles of justice and fairness. See 
Thomas Stamford Raffles, Substance of a Minute... On the Introduction of an Improved System of Internal 
Management and the Establishment of a Eand Rental on the Island of Java (London: n.p., 1814), p. 236. In his 
History of Java, Raffles comments: "Among many others, the following enactments, which were in force in 
some of the Eastern districts [of Java] when the English arrived, will serve to shew the barbarities of the 
law then existing, in its operation on the people, and its leniency towards the great." He offers as his first 
example, "Any person murdering his superior shall be beheaded, his body quartered and given to the 
wild beasts, and his head stuck upon a bambu." See Thomas Stamford Raffles, The History of Java, 2nd 
edition, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1830), p. 321. Raffles, like the anonymous author of A Voyage to the 
East Indies in 1747 and 1748, cited above, was happy to report stories that appeared to reflect badly on 
Dutch rule.
24 W. R. van Hoevell, "Wreede Strafoefening Vroeger op Java in Gebruik," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch 
Indie nieuwe serie 3,1 (1840): 168-71.
25 L[ammleth, J. K. D.], "Wreede Strafoefening op Sumatra's Westkust," Indisch Magazijn 1,4 (1844): 322-25.
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colonial presence in the archipelago should be seen in the context of a global civilizing 
process. The idea of a mission civilisatrice was distinctly attenuated in Dutch colonial 
thinking; although the Dutch came eventually to refer to their colonies as "tropisch 
Nederland" (tropical Netherlands), they had no more than a modest impulse to turn 
their colonial subjects into tropical Dutchmen and Dutchwomen. Nonetheless, the 
thinking of Beccaria, promulgated eighty years earlier, had helped to introduce into 
European colonial thought in the Indies the judgment that excessive and arbitrary 
punishment was both tyrannical and wasteful. The broader ideas of social progress, 
moreover, that were current in European thinking encouraged Europeans in the 
archipelago to see the indigenous peoples of the archipelago as standing at a range of 
earlier points on a stairway leading ever upwards towards Western civilization. Some 
inhabitants of the archipelago, such as the elusive Kubu in southern Sumatra, seemed 
to be utterly "primitive," caught in an era before the dawn of "civilization," whereas 
the Javanese were widely considered to be trapped in the mentality of the European 
middle ages, from which Europe itself had escaped not so long ago.26 Stories of Asiatic 
cruelty and excess may have fed an Orientalist sense of the native Other as alien from 
Western values, but for the colonial Dutch of the nineteenth century, the sense of 
familiarity was probably just as powerful: the Javanese rulers were a contemporary 
incarnation of the brutality of Europe's medieval despots, and Java's peoples ought to 
be helped to escape from them, as Europe itself had escaped.
In part, too, the ideas of a civilizing mission became acceptable because they 
offered a justification for colonial expansion. For much of the nineteenth century, the 
Dutch were anxious about the possibility that other powers might establish colonial 
footholds within the Indonesian archipelago, and in the course of the century, they 
undertook a concerted campaign to bring the remaining indigenous states of the 
archipelago definitively under Dutch hegemony. A part of the broader justification for 
this campaign was the argument that colonial rule would bring some of the benefits of 
Western law to peoples who had previously been under the arbitrary rule of despotic 
indigenous potentates. Even in Java, however, where Dutch hegemony had been long 
established, the argument that delivering law and order to Javanese society in general 
was both a moral obligation and an essential part of the strategy for sustaining colonial 
rule gained increasing strength.
The growing opinion in favor of legal reform was not directed only at indigenous 
authorities. There was a widespread perception that Dutch officials made arbitrary use 
of undefined powers in a way that was deeply oppressive to their indigenous subjects. 
In 1867, H. Beth, a critic of the colonial legal system, highlighted the arbitrariness of the 
colonial legal system by providing a list of crimes and misdemeanors for which 
colonial officials were recorded as having ordered punishment:
Being in possession of a suspect horse 
Excessive begging
Not going to help put an end to a fight 
Marrying off a girl who was too young
26 Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherlands Indies, 1900-1942 (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 1995), pp. 118-19.
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Theft
Household disputes 
Soliciting as a prostitute 
Causing death in a fight 
Losing track of one's wife 
Seduction 
Trading in love 
Killing a horse
Embezzlement from one's husband 
Possession of bad books
Walking around drunken as if one were a great man 
Planning adultery 
Secret marriage 
Attempting divorce
Attempting to commit suicide because of ill health 
Wounding oneself 
Stomach ache
Not reporting to the police that one has been wounded.2
The author sarcastically suggested that flogging someone who had failed to report 
being wounded might be a homeopathic measure. Beth clearly understood what we 
might now think of as a Foucauldian point: that there was little significance in the 
specific acts that were designated for punishment according to this list.27 8 Whereas the 
Marxists see political implications in the specific character of each law, postmodernist 
theory pioneered by Foucault in Discipline and Punish, argues that crime and
27 H. Beth, "Rottingslagen," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie 3e serie, 1,1 (1867): 519-20.
28 Indeed, the list is Foucauldian in another way. In its arbitrary and idiosyncratic composition, it is 
strikingly reminiscent of the Foucault's passage in The Order o f Things, in which he comments:
"This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the 
passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought—our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our 
age and our geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are 
accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and 
threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage quotes 'a 
certain Chinese encyclopedia' in which it is written that 'animals are divided into:
(a) belonging to the Emperor
(b) embalmed
(c) tame
(d) sucking pigs
(e) sirens
(f) fabulous
(g) stray dogs
(h) included in the present classification
(i) frenzied
(j) innumerable
(k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush
(l) et cetera
(m) having just broken the water pitcher
(n) that from a long way off look like flies.'"
See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology o f the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 2002 
[originally published 1966]), p. xvi.
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criminality are constructions.29 Particular behaviors are labeled as criminal not because 
they offend against some abstract notion of what constitutes proper behavior or even 
because they challenge the dominant system. Rather, crime is defined in order to create 
a tool for control or a license for excess. The choice of action to be designated as 
criminal is relatively arbitrary; what matters is that there be grounds for treating 
people as criminals and as potential criminals because criminalizing an action 
legitimizes harsh action both against those responsible and—in the name of 
prevention—against anyone who might in future be responsible for such acts.
The point being made by Beth in 1867 was not that the list might be improved by 
editing it to add or remove specific offenses, but rather that punishment was about 
power: every colonial official could hold every Native in terror by virtue of his power 
to impose punishment more or less arbitrarily.30 The list recorded the workings of a 
system in which the most innocent of actions might lead to terrible consequences if it 
attracted the hostile eye of a colonial official. "Terror" is a dangerous word to use in 
almost any context, but here it has a strictly analytical meaning. Generalized terror 
rests on an extreme form of discretion, on the power of the state to find any person 
guilty of a crime, especially of a serious, political crime, and especially when the 
consequent punishment is execution, torture, or prolonged detention. The essence of 
"terror" (as opposed to "terrorism," which is a strategy of non-state groups wishing to 
undermine state authority) lies partly in the severity of eventual punishments and 
partly in the capacity of the state to criminalize any of its subjects, because the law is 
loosely worded and because police and court procedures do not give any opportunity 
for an accused to refute the state's case against him or her. Kafka's The Trial, in which 
the protagonist is unable to find out what accusation has brought him before the 
courts, makes the same point. In this sense, there is some element of terror in all legal 
systems, because all of them equip the authorities abundantly with laws that make 
potential criminals of every person, while leaving the authority to decide whether to 
investigate or prosecute up to the discretion of power holders. Nonetheless, the extent 
of discretion has critical importance, and the critics of colonial law were aware of this 
importance. The key issue was the extreme lack of legal certainty. Modern 
criminologists are often willing to recognize that the laws themselves may have been 
created under a variety of influences, which make them imperfect either as a reflection 
of basic human values or as a means to achieve a social end,31 but they place great 
value on the existence of standard rules of behavior, irrespective of their content, 
because these rules provide a framework for regularized social life. This legal 
transparency was lacking in nineteenth-century colonial Indonesia.
The first tangible sign that such criticisms were being translated into revisions of 
policy in the Netherlands Indies came in the form of regulations to limit the use of the 
so-called rottingslagen, that is, beatings with rattan sticks, which had been a standard 
sentence in the first half of the century. It was a terrible punishment. The victim was
29 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York, NY: Random House, 1978), p. 
139.
30 Members of the samurai class had something of the same arbitrary authority in Tokugawa, Japan. See 
Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels, Women, and Outcastes: The Underside o f Modern Japan, 2nd edition (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 14-15.
31 For an introduction to this complex topic, see Steven L. Winter, "Human Values in a Postmodern 
World," Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 233 (1994): 233-48.
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tied to a pole and lashed across the buttocks with a thin strip of rattan, which was 
sometimes split for greater effect, sometimes soaked in water or hardened in fire. 
Africans, considered stronger and more bloodthirsty, were preferred for inflicting the 
punishment.32 Blood normally began to flow at the third blow, and in the hands of an 
experienced beater, the rattan stick soon began to bite deeply into the flesh of the 
victim. Occasionally the victims died, and severe scarring was common. All the worse, 
in the view of the reformers, was that this punishment could be applied more or less 
arbitrarily by any local European official, including for such offenses as impoliteness 
and indifference. In 1844, the colonial government had limited to forty the number of 
blows that could be struck in a single punishment. In 1848, this limit was reduced to 
twenty, and the beating of women was banned. In August 1862, the punishment was 
finally banned altogether, but in that year official records noted that a total of 474,375 
rattan blows had been carried out in the colony, most of them in Java.33
The increasingly utilitarian approach to law in the Netherlands Indies also led to 
the abolition of the system that required travel passes for Natives. Under a decree 
issued in 1816, all Natives traveling from one part of Java to another were required to 
obtain a permit from their place of origin. This permit was to be checked and endorsed 
by the local authorities in each major location along the route of travel, and anyone 
who lacked a pass or lacked the expected endorsements from earlier places along the 
presumed itinerary could be detained. As an extra means of control, both the traveler 
whose pass was not in order and the driver of the vehicle that carried him or her were 
liable to fines of f25 (later f5 0), a huge amount in those days (roughly, a laborer's 
annual wage). The rationale for the measure was to prevent the movement of criminals 
from one region to another in pursuit of their profession, and the presumption was 
that anyone who had been unable to obtain a pass must, indeed, be a criminal.34 
During the 1850s, however, the pass system was subject to much the same rationalist 
attack as the rottingslagen. A former Resident of the Preanger-Regentschappen in West 
Java, Jhr. Herman Constantijn van der Wijck, reported that, in his residency alone, the 
application of the pass laws for the sake of apprehending a hundred criminals had led 
some two thousand innocents to spend a total of 20,000 days in prison. In thoroughly 
utilitarian fashion, he calculated the value of the lost working time to be between 26 
and 27 thousand guilders. In addition, he pointed out, in 1856 alone, some 25,080 
passes had been issued, covering 120,550 persons (many passes were for groups 
traveling together), all of whom had to attend the passenbureau for the issue of the 
paperwork. This attendance, he estimated, took 320,000 person days. He did not gauge 
the additional time taken by travelers to report to the local authorities in each district 
they passed through, but the calculations he had made were already enough: the 
colonial government abolished the pass system for Java and Madura in 1863.35
Africans were recruited for colonial service in the Indies from the small Dutch possessions in the Gold 
Coast, today's Ghana.
33 For the abolition, see Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie [hereafter Stbl] 3 March 1866 no. 15; for the 
description and statistics, see "Twintig Rotan-slagen," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie 24,1 (1862): 319-22; 
Beth, "Rottingslagen," pp. 508-22; G. J. van Soest, "De Onveiligheid op Java en de Rotting," Tijdschrift voor 
Nederlandsch Indie nieuwe serie 5,1 (1876): 144.
34 See Brokx, Het Recht tot Wonen en tot Reizen, pp. 50-52.
35 Ibid., pp. 109-10.
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The abolition of the rottingslagen coincided, like the abolition of the pass system, 
more or less with the formal abolition of slavery in the directly ruled territories of the 
Netherlands Indies, which took place on July 1, 1863. Both initiatives arose primarily 
from a philanthropic movement aimed at eliminating the worst forms of maltreatment 
of human beings. In this recognition of some basic human equality of entitlement to 
decent treatment, both abolitions were a significant sign of universalizing forces in the 
management of the colonial legal system. The rottingslagen, slavery, and the pass 
system, however, had been only the tip of a vast structure of arbitrary legal treatment 
for indigenous Indonesians in the colony. Four decades later, spectacular cruelty might 
have disappeared from much of the colonial legal landscape, but the Diminished 
Welfare Investigation still condemned what it called the prentah-wezen (culture of 
command), in which Dutch and indigenous authorities could demand services from 
ordinary Indonesians, even though there was no legal basis for the demand. The 
investigation also criticized the inequity of a system in which Indonesian suspects 
could be summoned, searched, detained, and imprisoned by state authorities with 
minimal regard for proper procedure.36
Yet following the institution of these reforms, harsh punishment for minor 
infractions did not become simply a relic of the past. In 1872, the colonial authorities 
introduced the so-called "penal sanction" (poenale sanctie) as a means of enforcing 
discipline over indigenous contract workers throughout the archipelago.37 Although 
the colonial government abolished this provision in general in 1879, it was 
reintroduced in 1880,38 applying only to laborers recruited from outside East Sumatra 
to work on the plantations there. Under a standard labor contract, the relationship 
between the two parties is a purely civil one; breaches of the contract by one party may 
allow the other party to annul the agreement or to take civil action to recover damages. 
For the plantation managers of East Sumatra, however, neither of these sanctions was 
useful in dealing with recalcitrant laborers, especially those who ran away or refused 
to work. The managers wanted the laborers to keep working for low wages; annulling 
the contract was no use to them, and the laborers had little or no money to be 
recovered by civil action. The poenale sanctie made breaches of contract by a laborer a 
criminal offense, punishable by the state. It also gave the state the authority to arrest 
laborers who had fled their workplace and to return them to the plantation forcibly 
("met gebruik van den sterken arm," literally "with use of the strong arm"). From about 
1910, there was extensive discussion in colonial circles over the issue of diminishing 
the scope of the poenale sanctie. This debate was expressed in terms rather similar to 
those of the rottingslagen debate: opponents of the poenale sanctie argued that harsh 
punishments were both ineffective and inhumane. The result was a gradual reduction
36 Onderzoek naar de Mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera: Villa Overzicht van de 
uitkomsten der gewestelijke onderzoekingen naar't recht en de politie en daaruit gemadkte gevolgtrekken: Deel I 
Eigenlijk overzicht der afdeeUngsverslagen (1904—1907) (Weltevreden: Visser, 1911), p. 1.
37 Article 2, no. 27, Algemeen Politiestiafreglement voor Inlanders in Nederlandsch-Indie, Stbl 1872 no.
111. This rule applied to all indigenous laborers working under contracts with employers. Before 1872, the 
Chinese and Indian laborers in East Sumatra were formally subjects of the Sultan of Deli, who delegated 
his far-reaching powers of punishment over them to the planters. In 1873, however, the workers were 
removed from the authority of the sultan and placed under the colonial government. The poenale sanctie 
thus represented a diminution of the freedom of plantation managers to discipline their workers, though 
in practice little may have changed.
38 Stbl 1880 no. 133.
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in both the legal scope of the poenale sanctie and the extent to which the authorities 
resorted to using it.39 40But here we see such basic changes in the direction of legal 
universalism taking place only in the early decades of the twentieth century. No one in 
Indonesia who was alive when the fabric of colonial rule gave way to Japanese 
invasion in 1942 could have had any direct memory of the rottingslagen, but tens of 
thousands had had close contact with the poenale sanctie, and millions had experienced 
unpleasant arbitrary encounters with Dutch and indigenous officials.
The limits of colonial legal universalism are also apparent in the debate over the 
death penalty. Whereas until the first half of the nineteenth century, the death penalty 
had seemed to be the natural and appropriate penalty for a range of serious crimes, in 
Europe as much as Asia, the Beccarian impulse was to ask whether it was truly 
effective as a deterrent and to insist that it be carried out as efficiently and humanely as 
possible. The abolition of the death penalty in the Netherlands in 1870 immediately 
gave rise to discussion about the possibility of its abolition in the Indies. The discussion 
reached its peak early in the twentieth century, in discussions of the new criminal code 
for the colony.
Year Number of Persons 
Executed
1896 13
1897 37
1898 17
1899 15
1900 23
1901 9
1902 15
1903 7
1904 13
1905 29
1906 25
1907 23
1908 10
Table 1: Executions Carried Out in the Netherlands Indies, 1896-190840
39 See Herman J. Langeveld, "Arbeidstoestanden op de Ondernemingen ter Oostkust van Sumatra tussen 
1920 en 1940 in het Licht van het Verdwijnen van de Poenale Sanctie op de Arbeidscontracten," 
Economisch- en Sociiwl-Historisch Jaarboek 41 (1978): 294—368; and Ann Laura Staler, "Sumatran Transitions: 
Colonial Capitalism and Theories of Subsumption," International Social Science Journal 39,4 (1987): 543-62.
40 Ph. Kleintjes, "Wenschelijkheid der Afschaffing van de Doodstraf in het Algemeene Neergelegde 
Burgerlijk Strafrecht van Nederlandsch-Indie," Verslagen der Algemeene Vergaderingen van het Indisch 
Genootschap (1909-1910), pp. 169-70. Kleintjes's figures for 1896-1904 were derived from the Statistiek der
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Since the middle of the nineteenth century, a colonial prescription had prohibited 
the beheading of Muslims, because this was known to offend religious principles and 
because, in line with Beccarian thinking, it was felt that punishments should not be 
made harsher than necessary.41 In 1907, a correspondent for the Tijdschrift voor het 
Binnenlandsch Bestuur deplored what he described as the frequent botched executions 
by hanging and proposed instead a return to the traditional Javanese method of 
execution by stabbing with a Arris.42 In that same year, the colonial authorities declared 
that executions would no longer take place in public.43 The heart of the argument, 
however, as in the debate over the rottingslagen, was the question of whether the death 
penalty was so effective as a deterrent as to warrant its continuance, despite its 
inhumanity, though this argument was supplemented by the question of whether, 
given that no European had been executed in the colony since 1872, it was possible to 
justify the evident racial discrimination involved in executing Indonesians.44 Ph. 
Kleintjes, one of the foremost advocates of abolition, also pointed out the shortcomings 
of the legal process in the Indies, especially the unreliability of witnesses, which 
increased the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice in capital cases. The celebrated 
initiator of the "ethical" movement in Dutch colonial policy in the late nineteenth 
century, C.Th. van Deventer, added that it was hard to convince Indonesians that 
murder was wrong by killing them.45 Others, however, such as a correspondent for the 
Indisch Weekblad van het Recht, had no doubts:
In dealing with the natives, we cannot do without the death penalty. It would be 
a misunderstanding of the real situation, however, to conclude from this that the 
death penalty should also be retained for Europeans. The European belongs to a 
privileged caste, and this must remain the case, as long as a few thousands [of us] 
stand against millions [of them].46
This view prevailed and the death penalty thus remained part of the repertoire of the 
colonial legal authorities until the end and, indeed, continues to be applied in 
contemporary Indonesia.47
The death penalty still arouses strong emotions among both proponents and 
opponents, and it may not be the best indicator of Dutch colonial reluctance to move 
towards legal universalism. More telling, perhaps, is the inordinately slow progress of 
concrete plans to replace the VOC's legal pluralism in criminal law with a single 
criminal law that, like the Bataviasche Statuten, would apply to all residents of the 
Indies, irrespective of race. In 1847, the governor-general was instructed by the 
metropolitan authorities to take steps to draw up a new criminal code for the colony
Rechtsbedcling in Nederlandsch-Indie, those for 1905-08 from the annual colonial reports. The figures are for 
the directly ruled parts of the Netherlands Indies only. He noted that the peak in numbers of executions, 
which occurred in the years 1905-07, coincided with the governor-generalship of J. B. van Heutsz.
41 Kleintjes, "Wenschelijkheid der Afschaffing van de Doodstraf," pp. 172-74.
42J. J. van Aalst, "Doodstraf," Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur 32 (1907): 284-85.
43 Stbl 1907, no. 455.
44 Kleintjes, "Wenschelijkheid der Afschaffing van de Doodstraf," pp. 163-204.
45 Ibid., pp. 188-90,199-200.
46 Mr. Winckel (n.d.), cited in Kleintjes, "Wenschelijkheid der Afschaffing van de Doodstraf," pp. 176-77.
47 See Roeslan Saleh, Mas'alah pidana mati (Jakarta: Aksara Baru, 1978); and A. Hamzah and A. 
Sumangelipu, Pidana mati di Indonesia di masa lalu, kini dan di masa depart (Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, 1984).
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that would apply to all ethnic groups there. The colonial government installed a series 
of commissions to undertake this task, but they were distracted by other business, and 
eventually the Dutch government decided instead to introduce a criminal code 
(Wetboek van Strafrecht) for Europeans only. This code came into effect in 1867 and 
was matched a few years later in 1872 by a Strafwet voor Inlanders (Criminal Code for 
Natives).48 In fact, the difference between the two criminal codes in force after 1872 was 
relatively small. A few crimes were identified for indigenes that were not specified as 
crimes for Europeans, but for the most part the Strafwet voor Inlanders was based on 
the code for Europeans. This formal separation of the two codes, however, reflected the 
deep-seated colonial reluctance to surrender the principle of legal pluralism, except 
when forced into it by issues raised by evidence of egregious cruelty or inequality. The 
process of promulgating a criminal code for all ethnic groups in the archipelago was 
not completed until 1918, more than sixty years after the project had been initiated, 
with the issue of a new criminal code, the Wetboek van Strafwet (Kitab Undang- 
undang Hukum Pidana, KUHP). This new criminal code did nothing to prevent the 
vast range of arbitrary local arrangements that had a legal character by virtue of 
support from the local authority of Dutch and indigenous officials. The relative 
similarity of the two criminal codes of 1867 and 1872, furthermore, masked a 
significant difference in the punishments that courts could apply to criminals 
depending on their ethnicity: Europeans might be declared eerlos (without honor, 
meaning that they could not engage in normal commercial transactions) or expelled 
from the colony, whereas the penalties for indigenes were specified as forced physical 
labor (chained or unchained) and, until 1862, the rottingslagen. Only prison and 
execution by hanging were designated as penalties for both groups.49 The culmination 
of the long struggle for legal unification thus meant much less than it at first appears.
The similarity between the 1867 European and 1872 Native criminal codes did not 
mean that there was de facto a single criminal code in the Indies, because the colonial 
system distinguished between government, indigenous, and native state legal 
jurisdictions (gouvernementsrechtsipraak, inheemsche rechtspraak, zelfbestuursrechtspraak). 
The Netherlands Indies was divided constitutionally between directly and indirectly 
ruled territories, the latter consisting of native states (zelfbesturende landschappen, self- 
governing territories), which had been incorporated into the colony without the 
removal of the former ruler. At the end of the colonial era there were 282 of these 
native states, each of which administered its own criminal law for indigenes (but not 
for Europeans), working within frameworks set by the colonial authorities. In the 
directly ruled territories of the colony, the former sovereign rulers of indigenous states 
had been removed, or at least disempowered, but, for the most part, their aristocratic 
former subordinates ruled as the principal agents of the colonial states. The bupati 
(regents) of Java were the most prominent example of these new aristocratic 
authorities. In many, but not all, of these directly ruled regions, indigenous law also 
remained in force for Indonesians, though it was administered more closely by the 
colonial state after 1872. Each of the large islands was thus still a patchwork of
48 "Strafrecht," Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 4, pp. 133-34; Fasseur, "Een Vergeten 
Strafwetboek," p. 40; F. von Benda-Beckmartn and K. von Benda-Beckmann—Drooglever-Fortuijn, 
"Rechtspraak: Traditionele en Westerse Waarden in Fiistorisch Perspectief," in Indonesia Toen en Nu, ed. R. 
N. J. Kamerling (Amsterdam: Intermediate, 1980), p. 133.
49 Fasseur, "Een Vergeten Strafwetboek," p. 38.
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jurisdictions, in which indigenes on one side of an internal administrative border were 
subject to different laws from those on the other side.50 Still more important, ethnic 
differences in criminal law procedure were preserved within the government legal 
jurisdictions under the new, unified law. There were still parallel European and 
indigenous courts: for Europeans, the Residentiegerechten (Residency courts) and 
above them six regional Raden van Justitie (councils, i.e., courts, of justice), while 
criminal cases involving indigenes were tried in the landraden ("land councils," i.e., 
regional courts). For petty misdemeanors, both Europeans and indigenes came before 
the landgerechten (local courts), a tier of the judiciary established in 1914 partly in 
anticipation of the unified Wetboek van Strafwet, but mainly in response to indigenous 
resentment concerning the arbitrary powers of the police and local government under 
the so-called politierol,51 Even in the landgerechten, however, Europeans could only be 
tried before a European judge.52 53Indigenes also enjoyed fewer procedural protections 
during house searches, interrogation, and remand."1
All legal systems contain at least some elements of pluralism because different 
categories of people are treated differently when they encounter the police and the 
courts. Children are commonly distinguished formally from adults, and men 
sometimes from women. Mainstream criminologists freely acknowledge that there is 
no universal principle by which the interests of society can be judged, and they 
therefore allow a cultural, and often religious, component to be introduced in the 
definition of crime. This is especially true of actions relating to sexuality and 
reproduction: abortion may be legal within one jurisdiction and illegal within another, 
on the basis of different but equally coherent moral arguments. A relationship 
classified as incest in one jurisdiction (such as marriage between first cousins) may be 
socially preferred in another, and so on. Class, gender, racial, religious, and other 
distinctions work informally and to different degrees in different systems as pretexts 
for differential treatment. Colonial systems, in general, differed from metropoles in the 
extent to which formal legal distinctions based on race, ethnicity, or nationality were 
institutionalized because colonial orders tended to depend on racial distinction in 
order to uphold the advantage of the colonizer. The Netherlands Indies, however, was 
unusual in the colonial world in the extent and formality of its legal pluralism.54 This
50 J. E. Jonkers, Vromve Justitia in de Tropen Strafrecht) (Deventer: W vanHoeve, 1942), pp. 8-9; A. D. A. de 
Kat Angelino, Colonial Policy: Volume II, The Dutch East Indies (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1931), pp. 175- 
93. For a map showing the extensive regions of the archipelago under native legal jurisdiction, see Von 
Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beckmann—Drooglever-Fortuijn, "Rechtspraak," p. 128; and [J. H.] 
Logemann, "De Afbakening van de Rechtsmacht tussen Gouvernementsrechter en Landschapsrechter," 
lndisch Tijdschrift van het Recht 147 (1938): 399-427.
51 The politierol (police role) was a register of minor misdemeanors that could be punished by the police 
without any formal legal process and without the possibility of appeal. Penalties imposed were normally 
in the form of fines (up to f t  00, later /500), imprisonment (up to eight days), or compulsory labor without 
payment (up to three months). The politierol was widely hated because of the scope it gave for arbitrary, 
oppressive behavior by the police. See De Kat Angelino, Colonial Policy: Volume II, pp. 151-52.
52 During the twentieth century, however, increasing numbers of native lawyers worked as judges in the 
European court system and thus sat in judgment on Europeans in their own courts.
53 Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems, and Politics (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1944), pp. 193-94.
54 J. S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and the Netherlands Indies (New 
York, NY: New York University Press, 1956 [original ed. 1948]), pp. 271-73. Furnivall makes this point 
explicitly for the British and Dutch colonies. Mahmood Mamdani, by contrast, has argued for the 
pervasive consequences of legal pluralism in colonial Africa, but his discussion does not provide sufficient
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situation can be explained partly by institutional inertia—the assumptions of legal 
pluralism that were commonplace in the seventeenth century survived into the 
twentieth—and partly by the relative weakness of the Dutch sense of civilizing 
missions. The colonial government was unapologetic that its legal system did not treat 
everyone with majestic equality, and nowhere else in the colonial world was there so 
complicated a system of multiple legal orders within a single jurisdiction. Nonetheless, 
the colony's divergence from the principle of legal universalism needed explanation 
and justification. That explanation and justification came from an essentialist 
assumption that the cultural differences between Europeans and the indigenous 
peoples of the archipelago both demanded and permitted a different style of 
government from that which was expected of states in Europe.
Legal dualism in the Netherlands Indies drew its intellectual strength from the 
colonial administration of family law. Dutch authorities recognized that matters 
concerning marriage, inheritance, and authority over children generally had little 
bearing on colonial economic interests but could arouse powerful emotions among the 
people if authorities interfered with them. Colonial strategy, therefore, was to 
recognize, record, and implement every variant of family law that was to be found in 
the archipelago. Legal pluralism in matters of family and private law raised some of 
the same universalist issues as had arisen in discussions of criminal law when it came 
to the rights of women, but arguments for the equality of all men were widely accepted 
long before comparable arguments about the equality of women and men. After all, 
these matters related especially to the position of women and children within the 
family, and even in the twentieth century there was a profound reluctance on the part 
of lawmakers in the West to allow that relations between individuals within a family 
ought to be governed by more or less the same principles as the relations between 
individuals within society in general. In a colony, moreover, where a majority of the 
population was Muslim, it was a logical position to recognize that cultural difference 
should be respected in matters such as inheritance rights, age of marriage, 
responsibility for children, and so forth. The foremost advocate of cultural dualism in 
family law was the jurist C. van Vollenhoven, who presided over a massive colonial 
project aimed at collecting basic information on the traditional law (adatrecht) of every 
indigenous ethnic group in the colony. The results were published in the 
Adatrechtbundels, which then formed a corpus of legal practice for the administration of 
private law in each of the nineteen so-called adatrechtkringen (adatrecht circles), broader 
families of adatrecht tradition which the Dutch scholars found it convenient and logical 
to group together.55 The Adatrechtbundels were not a formal codification of traditional
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law, but rather a somewhat chaotic assemblage of excerpts from travelers' reports, 
official documents, and translated indigenous texts, grouped by region and, to some 
extent, by topic. Nonetheless, they provided a convenient corpus of information on 
traditional legal practice throughout the archipelago. In a colonial environment where 
the appropriateness of legal pluralism for family law was accepted as given, the 
argument from family law became an important buttress to a more general pluralist 
impulse, which had its roots in both colonial parsimony and a doctrinal belief that 
cultural differences ought to be reflected in arrangements for governance.
The pronounced legal pluralism of the colonial order in the Netherlands Indies 
contributed to the character of the Indonesian national movement that began to 
develop in the early twentieth century. The consequence of the pluralist colonial legal 
order was not that it created a sense of common identity across the archipelago by 
giving those classified as Natives a common experience of colonialism. Rather, it 
reinforced the understanding of indigenous people in the Indies that colonialism 
functioned by denying common experiences to its subjects, by keeping them on a 
tangle of different legal and social footings. The perception that the principal Dutch 
political strategy was one of "divide and rule" contributes to a fear of the consequences 
of division and diversity that has outlasted the Dutch colonial regime. When 
postcolonial Indonesians have invoked the national motto, Bhinneka tunggal ika 
(literally "They are many, they are one," but commonly translated as "Unity in 
diversity"), unity has consistently trumped diversity. The enduring power of the 
rhetoric of persatuan dan kesatuan (unity and one-ness) in independent Indonesia has 
some of its roots in the memory of how the colonial order recruited pluralism and 
diversity as tools to perpetuate foreign domination.
Perhaps even more important, the absence of universal law, even as a generally 
accepted ideal, may have had a deep impact on the attitude of Indonesians to law. The 
colonial system did not just fall short of universalism in practice—it was probably not 
even the worst offender amongst colonial powers in this respect, and certainly not the 
worst offender among the authoritarian regimes of the twentieth century—but it 
repudiated universalism in principle. In so doing, the Dutch colonial order created an 
environment in which law could not be seen to represent universal values: law was a 
reflection of identity, it was an aspect of power. This insight raises a sensitive paradox: 
the awareness that law is embedded in cultural values and political power is valuable 
to scholarship; indeed it would now be naive to ignore the embeddedness of legal 
systems. Yet the same awareness is dangerous in social life, because it is an obstacle to 
the conviction that law can embody universal human values transcending individual 
interest. Not only did the Dutch colonial state not bequeath its doctrinal respect for 
cultural diversity to its successor, the Indonesian Republic, but it bequeathed an 
inexperience with legal universalism and a cynicism about the purpose of the law that 
remains one of contemporary Indonesia's most serious burdens.
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